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1 Introduction and motivation
This work is concerned with ethical aggregation of infinite utility streams, thus
position i is typically interpreted as the endowment of generation i. We analyze
the broad question: In order for the social welfare to increase, the interest of
how many generations can be respected if we intend to be egalitarian in the
appropriate sense?
With regard to a given infinite utility streams, various efficiency axioms cap-
ture the general principle that adequate changes must improve the social wel-
fare. TheWeak Dominance axiom (WD) captures the following spirit: improv-
ing the welfare of one single generation suffices to improve the social welfare.
In turn, the Weak Pareto axiom (WP) requests that all generations increase
their utility for the social welfare to improve, and the Strong Pareto axiom
requests that at least one generation increases its utility for the social welfare
to improve. Intermediate positions have been studied, like the Strong Mono-
tonicity for Infinite Generations axiom in Sakai (2006). Under this postulate
an increase in the utility of any infinite number of generations conveys a higher
social welfare.
How far can we go in this efficiency scale under different egalitarian assump-
tions? Let us focus on the case of evaluations of the streams by utilities. In
this context, Basu and Mitra (2003) prove that Strong Pareto is incompat-
ible with the equal treatment of all generations for any non-trivial setting,
though Weak Pareto is compatible with that equity postulate in l∞, the set of
bounded real-valued sequences (Basu and Mitra, 2007). Therefore, assuming
the equal treatment of all generations imposes a restriction as to the number
of generations that must be benefitted for the social evaluation to increase:
it is sensible to assume that it is finite, but it is not to claim that it can
be arbitrary (because no such numerical evaluation exists). In a related line,
Banerjee (2006) yields the incompatibility of Weak Dominance with the egal-
itarian axiom called HEF in the X = [0, 1]N context. This imposes a bound
to the compromise efficiency vs. consequentialist egalitarianism as expressed
by HEF: it is impossible that improving the welfare of any single generation
conveys a higher social evaluation as a general efficiency principle. But, sup-
pose that we define axiom WD2 by asking that improving the welfare of two
generations must improve the social welfare, which supposes a lesser degree
of efficiency than WD. Then there is a strikingly simple explicit evaluation
that verifies WD2 and a reinforced version of HEF called 1RNS: we just take∑+∞
i=2
1
2i
. In fact this claim holds in l∞ and a much stronger version of Pareto-
efficiency is obtained. Properties resembling 1RNS are studied in Alcantud
and Garc´ıa-Sanz (2010b). Axiom kRNS means that when comparing streams
that are constant for the future of generation k (i.e., from generation k + 1
onwards) then the extended present from the first to the k-th generation does
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not matter: the higher the “long-run” endowment the better. Peculiarly, if we
want to keep the degree of efficiency given by WD2 and extend the degree
of egalitarianism from 1RNS to just 2RNS then we can mimick Banerjee’s
argument and deduce that impossibility returns. The need for a compromise
between degrees of efficiency and of egalitarianism becomes apparent here. We
proceed to give some general results about that broad issue.
This work is organized as follows. We set our notation and axioms in Section 2.
Assuming that all generations must be treated equally, we disclose the trade-off
between the number of generations that must be benefitted for the society to
be strictly better, and the number of generations that can be discarded when
comparing streams that are constant in the long run. This constitutes Section
3. We perform an analogous analysis under variants of the Hammond Equity
principle that capture inequality aversion in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes
and gives some concluding remarks.
2 Notation and statement of the axioms
Let X denote a subset of RN, that represents a domain of utility sequences
or infinite-horizon utility streams. We adopt the usual notation for such util-
ity streams: x = (x1, ..., xn, .......) ∈ X. By (y)con we mean the constant se-
quence (y, y, ....), (x, (y)con) holds for (x, y, y, y, ....), and (x1, ..., xk, (y)con) =
(x1, ..., xk, y, y, ....) denotes an eventually constant sequence. We write x > y
if xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, ..., and x≫ y if xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, .... Also,
x > y means x > y and x 6= y. We use the notation N∗ = N ∪ {0}
A social welfare function (SWF) is a function W : X −→ R. In this paper we
are concerned with two sets of axioms of different nature on SWFs. They can
be rephrased for social welfare relations (SWRs, i.e., binary relations on X)
in a direct manner.
Firstly we introduce some equity axioms of two different classes. Axiom AN
below is the usual “equal treatment of all generations” postulate. Then we list
some consequentialist equity axioms, that implement preference for egalitarian
allocations of utilities among generations in various senses.
Axiom AN (Anonymity). Any finite permutation of a utility stream produces
a utility stream with the same social utility
The next axiom was introduced in Asheim and Tungodden (2004a).
Axiom HEF (Hammond Equity for the Future). If x,y ∈ X are such that
x = (x1, (x)con) and y = (y1, (y)con) (x1 > y1 > y > x) , then W(y) > W(x) .
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When W(y) > W(x) is requested in place of W(y) > W(x) we refer to
HEF+.
HEF states the following ethical restriction on the ranking of streams where
the level of utility is constant from the second period on and the present gen-
eration is better-off than the future: if the sacrifice by the present generation
conveys a higher utility for all future generations, then such trade off is weakly
preferred. Asheim and Tungodden (2004a) and Asheim et al. (2007), Section
4.3, explain that it is a very weak equity condition –under certain consistency
requirements on the social preferences “condition HEF is much weaker and
more compelling than the standard ‘Hammond Equity’ condition”– that can
be endorsed both from an egalitarian and utilitarian point of view.
The following equity axiom is in line with the spirit of HEF+. It captures a
very demanding ethical principle: a large improvement in a finite number of
generations can never compensate a sustained improvement for all remaining
generations.
Axiom RNS (Restricted Non-Substitution). If x,y ∈ X are such that x =
(x1, ..., xl, (x)con) and y = (y1, ..., ym, (y)con) with y > x , then W(y) >W(x) .
A weaker version states that a large improvement in a fixed finite number
of generations never compensates a sustained improvement for all remaining
generations. Formally:
Axiom mRNS (m-Restricted Non-Substitution). If x,y ∈ X are such that
x = (x1, ..., xm, (x)con) and y = (y1, ..., ym, (y)con) for some generation m, and
y > x , then W(y) >W(x) .
As applied to social welfare relations, 1RNS implies Weak Non-Substitution in
Asheim et al. (2008), which implies HEF. Besides, mRNS implies (m−1)RNS
for m = 2, 3, ....
Axioms HE below is another consequentialist equity principle stating that in
case of a conflict between two generations, every other generation being as
well off, the stream where the least favoured generation is better off must be
weakly preferred.
Axiom HE (Hammond Equity). If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj > yk > xk
for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) > W(x).
A variant of this principle is the following postulate of aversion to inequality.
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Axiom VWIA (Very Weak Inequality Aversion). If x,y ∈ X are such that
xj > yj = yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then
W(y) > W(x) .
VWIA advocates for a weak preference for streams that do not produce in-
equality between two generations when such unequal endowments are con-
flicting, every other generation being as well off. VWIA is called HE(b) in
Alcantud and Garc´ıa-Sanz (2010b).
We intend to account for some kind of efficiency too. In this sense the stronger
property we deal with is the following Axiom SP, which is weakened to SP n
below.
Axiom SP (Strong Pareto). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then W(x) >W(y) .
Axiom SP n. If x,y ∈ X are such that x > y , and there is a finite I ⊆ N
with cardinality at least n such that xi > yi when i ∈ I, then W(x) >W(y) .
The interpretation of SP n is clear: if at least n generations improve their
welfare, the remaining generations being as well off, then the social evaluation
must be higher.
Other axioms that relax Strong Pareto follow.
Axiom WP (Weak Pareto). If x,y ∈ X and x≫ y, then W(x) >W(y).
Axiom WD (Weak Dominance). If x,y ∈ X and there is j ∈ N such that
xj > yj, and xi = yi for all i 6= j, then W(x) >W(y).
Because even Weak Dominance is incompatible with interesting equity axioms
we consider the next relaxed versions.
Axiom WD n. If there is a finite I ⊆ N with cardinality at least n, such that
xi > yi when i ∈ I and xj = yj when j /∈ I, then W(x) >W(y) .
Axiom WD n. If there is I finite with {1, 2, ..., n} ⊆ I ⊆ N, such that xi > yi
when i ∈ I and xj = yj when j /∈ I, then W(x) >W(y) .
The interpretation of these axioms is straightforward too. WD n claims that if
a finite number of at least n generations improve their welfare, the other gen-
erations’ utilities being unchanged, then the social evaluation must be higher.
WD n is a relaxed version where the first n generations must improve their
welfare in order for the consequence to follow.
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Our last axiom is implied by SP and implies WD (in fact, it is the conjunction
of WD and WP).
Axiom 6 (Partial Pareto, also PP). If x,y ∈ X and either x≫ y or there is
j ∈ N such that xj > yj and xi = yi for all i 6= j, then W(x) >W(y).
We can list some trivial relationships between concepts. Clearly, WD implies
WD n for each n, and WD 1 is just WD. For a fixed n, SP ⇒ SP n ⇒
WD n ⇒ WD n. In the presence of AN, WD
n and WD n are equivalent. For
any index n = 2, 3, ..., WD n−1 ⇒ WD n and WD n−1 ⇒ WD n. We refer to
axioms of myopic Pareto-efficiency to refer to versions SP n, WD n and WD n
of Pareto-efficiency, since these axioms are insensitive to positive increases in
the endowments of “small” numbers of generations.
WD n
WD n
WD
Strong Pareto
SP n
+ AN
Figure 1. Relationships between efficiency axioms for a fixed n.
3 Egalitarianism as Restricted Non-Substitution
In this Section we investigate to what extent myopic Pareto-efficiency and
mRNS can be assured simultaneously. This permits to complement the con-
clusion that the interest of a single generation as captured by WD is incom-
patible with HEF (Banerjee, 2006), which is implied by any mRNS egalitarian
postulate. Consider the following Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 Let m,n ∈ {1, 2, ....}.
(a) If n > m + 1,
∑+∞
i=n
xi
2i
is an explicit SWF on X = l∞ that satisfies SP
n
and mRNS.
(b) If n 6 m, there are not SWFs on [0, 1]N that satisfy WD n and mRNS.
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Proof: Part (a) is immediate. To prove (b) we closely follow Banerjee’s (2006)
argument thus we proceed by contradiction. For each 0 < x < 1
2
we let
L(x) :=W
(
x, n..., x,
(
x
2
)
con
)
and R(x) :=W
(
2x, n..., 2x,
(
x
2
)
con
)
Then I(x) := (L(x), R(x)) is non-empty by WD n. Furthermore
1
2
> y > x > 0
implies I(x) ∩ I(y) = ∅, since n + 1 6 m+ 1 and mRNS entail
L(y) =W
(
y, n..., y,
(
y
2
)
con
)
>W
(
2x, n..., 2x,
(
x
2
)
con
)
= R(x)
This is impossible because an uncountable number of different rational num-
bers can be assigned. 
Proposition 1 concerns how far we can extend the interest of the present. It
clarifies the trade-off between the interest of the extended present with respect
to both efficiency and egalitarianism as Restricted Non-Substitution. Part (b)
assures that if improving the utilities of the first n generations suffices to im-
prove the social welfare, then improving the utilities of the first n generations
must compensate sustained improvements for all remaining generations for
some particular endowments.
If further we are interested in discussing how many generations matter –and
not only which ones matter–, anonymity must be introduced in the argu-
ment. Thus we now focus on elucidating if there exist SWFs that satisfy AN,
mRNS and SP n (or suitable weakenings) in the cases that are not discarded
by Proposition 1 (b).
Regarding SP n the next Proposition settles the matter irrespective of the
feasible set of utilities. It discloses an incompatibility between AN and any
SP n by extending the argument in Basu an Mitra (2003) which shows that
AN and SP can not be combined in any non-trivial setting.
Proposition 2 For each n = 1, 2, ..., there are not SWFs on Y N that satisfy
AN and SP n when Y contains more than one element.
Proof:We use a standard construction (cf., Basu and Mitra, 2003) to produce
an uncountable collection {Ei}i∈I of infinite proper subsets of N with the
property i < j ⇒ Ei ( Ej and Ej − Ei is infinite , ∀i, j ∈ I. In order to do
that, let {r1, r2, ....} be an enumeration of the rational numbers in (0, 1) and
set E(i) = {n ∈ N : rn < i} for each i ∈ I = (0, 1).
Suppose by way of contradiction, that W is a real-valued function on Y N
that verifies AN and SP n for some n ∈ {1, 2, ...}. We assume without loss of
generality that {0, 1} ⊆ Y . With each i ∈ I we associate the following two
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utility streams:
L(i) such that L(i)p =


1 if p ∈ Ei
0 otherwise
R(i) obtained from L(i) by replacing the first n appearences of 0 with a 1
By SP n, the open interval (W(L(i)), W(R(i))) is not empty. A routine argu-
ment permits to check that i < j ⇒ W(L(j)) > W(R(i)), because Ej − Ei
infinite and Ei ⊆ Ej imply that a finite permutation of L(j) can be compared
to R(i) via the SP n assumption. This completes the argument. 
Remark 1 We can now reach a conclusion as to the analysis of SWFs on the
ground set Y N when Y ⊆ N∗. In this case there are SWFs that satisfy AN,
RNS and PP, thus mRNS and WD n for all m, n (cf., Theorem 1 in Alcantud
and Garc´ıa-Sanz, 2010a, also 2010b). But even if we are not bound by any
mRNS ethical restriction, AN and SP n are incompatible irrespective of n.
In order to complete the analysis of SWFs on [0, 1]N under the mRNS egali-
tarian postulate, we only need to elucidate if AN, mRNS and WD n (or equiv-
alently, WD n) can be respected simultaneously. The next result solves this
question in the negative.
Proposition 3 There are not SWFs on X = [0, 1]N that satisfy AN, mRNS
and WD n when n > m+ 1 (n,m ∈ N).
Proof: Suppose that W : X −→ R satisfies AN, mRNS and WDm+1 (or
equivalently, WDm+1). If we deduce a contradiction we are done.
We first check that
x > y > z implies W(x, m..., x, (y)con) >W(z, m..., z, (y)con)
because W(x, m..., x, (y)con) > W(y, m..., y, z, m..., z, (y)con) by WD
2m (which is
implied by WDm+1), and also W(y, m..., y, z, m..., z, (y)con) = W(z, m..., z, (y)con)
by AN.
For each 0 < x < 1
2
we let
L(x) :=W
(
x
2
, m...,
x
2
, (x)con
)
and R(x) :=W(2x, m..., 2x, (x)con)
Then I(x) := (L(x), R(x)) is non-empty as shown above. Besides, 1
2
> y >
x > 0 implies I(x) ∩ I(y) = ∅ due to mRNS:
L(y) =W
(
y
2
, m...,
y
2
, (y)con
)
>W(2x, m..., 2x, (x)con) = R(x)
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This is impossible because an uncountable number of different rational num-
bers can be assigned. 
4 Egalitarianism via inequality aversion
The setting [0, 1]N does not permit to evaluate the streams by utilities that
agree with WD and HE/VWIA: cf., Subsection 5.1 in Alcantud and Garc´ıa-
Sanz (2010b). This means that under either of the mentioned forms of aversion
to inequality, it is not possible to attach numerical evaluations that are posi-
tively sensitive to a gain in utility by a single generation. In this Section we
verify the tightness of such assertion in two related lines. In the first place,
Subsection 4.1 proves that even if we relax the efficiency requirement to any
arbitrarily weak WD n then impossibility is preserved. In the second, Subsec-
tion 4.2 proves that if we replace the egalitarian postulate in order to adopt
a related axiom (namely, the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle) then the situ-
ation is quite different: The latter principle and anonymity can be combined
under representability of the social evaluation in the presence of WD. With
respect to this existence result we analyze if adopting WP –responsiveness to
universal gains of utility– instead of WD –responsiveness to individual gains
of utility– preserves the compatibility. We conclude in the negative even if we
forgo anonymity. Incompatibility with a representable social ordering arises
when VWIA and WP are implemented too. These additional impossibilities
stress the peculiar significance of our existence result.
Some preliminary remarks are in order. It is routine to check that when
X = [0, 1]N axioms HE and VWIA are equivalent in the presence of WD
(cf., Section 3 in Alcantud and Garc´ıa-Sanz, 2010b). This is not true under
weaker assumptions thus in order to check for compatibility with our relaxed
versions of WD we need to argue separately for the two axioms. In addition,
under WD both egalitarian axioms are equivalent to the following slightly
strengthened form of their conjuntion when X = [0, 1]N :
Axiom HE(a)+. If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj > yk > xk for some
j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) >W(x).
4.1 Hammond Equity and myopic weak dominance
In this Subsection we analyze the interest of how many generations can be
respected as to efficiency, when the Hammond Equity spirit is assumed. The
following Proposition proves that both HE and VWIA end up in impossibility
with every arbitrarily weak WD n axiom.
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Proposition 4 For any n ∈ N, there are not SWFs on X = [0, 1]N that
verify HE –resp., VWIA– and WD n .
Proof: Assume that W : X −→ R satisfies VWIA and WD n. For each
0 < x < 1 we let
L(x) :=W(x, 2n..., x, 0, 0, ....) and R(x) :=W
(
1 + x
2
, n...,
1 + x
2
, x, n..., x, 0, 0, ....
)
thus I(x) := (L(x), R(x)) 6= ∅ due to WD n .
2 A sequential application of
VWIA proves that I(x) ∩ I(y) = ∅ for every 1
2
> y > x > 0 (which entails
1+x
2
> y > x) because
L(y) =W(y, 2n....., y, 0, 0, ....) >W
(
1 + x
2
, y, n−1......, y, x, y, n−1......, y, 0, 0, ....
)
>
>W
(
1 + x
2
,
1 + x
2
, y, n−2......, y, x, x, y, n−2......, y, 0, 0, ....
)
> .... >
>W
(
1 + x
2
, n...,
1 + x
2
, x, n..., x, 0, 0, ....
)
= R(x)
This produces an uncountable number of different rational numbers, a contra-
diction.
Suppose now that W : X −→ R satisfies HE and WD n. We proceed to
assign an uncountable number of different rational numbers, which yields the
contradiction. For each 0 < x < 1 we now let
l(x) :=W
(
1 + 3x
6
, n...,
1 + 3x
6
, x, n..., x, 0, 0, ....
)
and
r(x) :=W
(
1 + x
2
, n...,
1 + x
2
, x, n..., x, 0, 0, ....
)
thus J(x) := (l(x), r(x)) 6= ∅ due to WD n . A sequential application of HE
proves that J(x) ∩ J(y) = ∅ for every 1
3
> y > x > 0 (which entails 1+x
2
>
1+3y
6
> y > x) because
l(y) =W
(
1 + 3y
6
, n...,
1 + 3y
6
, y, n..., y, 0, 0, ....
)
>
>W
(
1 + x
2
,
1 + 3y
6
, n−1......,
1 + 3y
6
, x, y, n−1......, y, 0, 0, ....
)
>
>W
(
1 + x
2
,
1 + x
2
,
1 + 3y
6
, n−2......,
1 + 3y
6
, x, x, y, n−2......, y, 0, 0, ....
)
> .... >
>W
(
1 + x
2
, n...,
1 + x
2
, x, n..., x, 0, 0, ....
)
= r(x)

2 This argument is inspired in the proof of the incompatibility between WD and
HE/VWIA in Alcantud and Garc´ıa-Sanz (2010b).
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As is apparent from Proposition 4, if we intend to implement the spirit of the
Hammond Equity principle then we must discard any myopic version of the
Weak Dominance efficiency postulate. Alternatively, if we admit that strict
improvements of the endowments of a finite and higher than n number of
generations must convey a strictly better social evaluation, then the spirit of
the Hammond Equity principle must be contradicted, large as n may seem.
We conclude that a compromise between these two spirits (HE and myopic
WD) can not be reached by relaxing the efficiency postulate sufficiently.
4.2 Inequality aversion and responsiveness to gains by one or all generations
As was mentioned, when X = [0, 1]N no evaluation by a SWF that is pos-
itively sensitive to a Paretian improvement by one single generation verifies
the equivalent HE, VWIA or HE(a)+. In Subsection 4.1 we have checked that
adopting a myopic position as to the efficiency postulate does not reverse the
conclusion. Nonetheless, the appeal to the following Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle permits to resolve this impossibility.
Axiom PDT (Pigou-Dalton transfer principle). If x,y ∈ X are such that
there is ε > 0 with yj = xj − ε > yk = xk + ε for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt
when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) >W(x).
PDT is a notion of inequality aversion in a cardinal vein that has been intro-
duced in this literature by Bossert et al. (2007) –under the name strict trans-
fer principle– and Sakai (2006). 3 We proceed to show that the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle and anonymity can be combined with weak dominance under
representability of the social evaluation. This is quite remarkable by contrast
with the fact that the PDT postulate is in conflict with upper or lower semi-
continuity with respect to the sup topology when we use acyclic SWRs (cf.,
Hara et al. (2008), Theorem 1 and comment in pp. 185). By incorporating
the arguments in Sakai (2006) these authors claim that their “impossibility
theorems are robust with respect to the choice of continuity axioms” (a fact
that is further enhanced by their Section 4, which shows that their impos-
sibility results are valid for a wide class of topologies). Proposition 5 below
contributes to qualifying the robustness of this argument as to the rationality
assumptions on the evaluation.
Proposition 5 There are SWFs on X = [0, 1]∞ that verify PDT, AN and
3 The formulation in Bossert et al. (2007) is different but equivalent: if x,y ∈ X
are such that xj > yj > yk > xk and xj + xk = yj + yk for some j, k ∈ N, and
xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) > W(x). This version is parallel in structure
to the HE-related axioms.
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WD.
Proof: The binary relation on X given by x ∼ y if and only if xi = yi
eventually is an equivalence relation. From each equivalence class [x]∼ in the
quotient set X
∼
we select a representative gx. We decompose gx = (gx1 , g
x
2 , ...)
as is standard. Thus when x = (x1, ..., xn, ...),y = (y1, ..., yn, ...) are eventually
coincident (i.e., there is k such that xi = yi for all i > k) one has g
x = gy.
For each N ∈ N and x ∈ X we denote
AN(x) = (g
x
1 )
2 + ... + (gxN)
2 − (x21 + ....+ x
2
N )
BN(x) = 2(x1 + ....+ xN − g
x
1 − ...− g
x
N)
For any fixed x both sequences {AN(x)}N and {BN(x)}N are eventually con-
stant thus it is trivial that the function
WPD(x) = limN→∞(AN(x)) + limN→∞(BN (x)) = limN→∞(AN(x) +BN(x))
is well defined and AN. We proceed to check that it verifies PDT and WD.
The Pigou-Dalton transfer principle derives from the following arithmetic
property: for every m1, m2 ∈ R and ε > 0 such that m1 − ε > m2 + ε one has
(m1)
2 + (m2)
2 > (m1 − ε)
2 + (m2 + ε)
2 (1)
Some simple manipulations transform this claim into 2ε(m1 − m2 − ε) > 0,
which holds true because m1 −m2 > 2ε > ε > 0. Now select x,y ∈ X such
that there is ε > 0 with yj = xj−ε > yk = xk+ε for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt
when j 6= t 6= k. Then gx = gy, and BN (x) = BN (y) eventually. Thus the
fact that WPD(y) > WPD(x) is equivalent to proving that AN(y) > AN (x)
eventually, which holds if we check that for N > j, k the following holds:
(gx1 )
2 + ...+ (gxN)
2 − (y21 + ....+ y
2
N) > (g
x
1 )
2 + ... + (gxN)
2 − (x21 + ....+ x
2
N )
This trivially amounts to
x21 + .... + x
2
N > y
2
1 + .... + y
2
N
and therefore to
x2j + x
2
k > y
2
j + y
2
k
which holds by Equation (1) as applied to m1 = xj and m2 = xk.
To end the proof we check for WD. Because AN has been ensured, it suffices
to prove that if x, y are such that x1 > y1 and xj = yj when j > 1, then
WPD(x) >WPD(y) . Observe that g
x = gy and thus
WPD(x)−WPD(y) = −x
2
1 + y
2
1 + 2(x1 − y1) =
12
= 2(x1 − y1)− (x1 − y1)(x1 + y1) = (x1 − y1)(2− (x1 + y1)) > 0
This completes the proof. 
Remark 2 Proposition 5 assures the existence of representable social welfare
relations with PDT and AN –two different ehical considerations that incorpo-
rate intergenerational equity in terms of distributive fairness and equal treat-
ment of the generations– plus WD. We are not aware of any prior construction
of a representable social welfare relation that verifies the Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle.
Now it is apparent that in the context of PDT social welfare evaluations,
imposing continuity restrictions with respect to a wide class of topologies as
specified in Hara et al. (2008), Section 4, is much stronger than imposing
anonymity, weak dominance, and representability.
Because WP and WD are unrelated, Proposition 5 leaves the following ques-
tion open: Can we incorporate positive responsiveness to an increase in the
endowment of every generation under PDT? Proposition 6 answers this ques-
tion in the negative.
Proposition 6 There are not SWFs on X = [0, 1]N that verify PDT and
WP. 4
Proof: If W : X −→ R satisfies PDT and WP then we can assign an un-
countable number of different rational numbers, which is impossible, in the
following manner. For each 0 < x < 1
2
we fix 0 < εx such that x+ εx <
1
2
, and
then let
L(x) :=W (1− x, x, x, ....) and R(x) :=W
(
1−
x
2
, x+ εx, x+ (εx)
2, ....
)
thus I(x) := (L(x), R(x)) 6= ∅ due to WP. We proceed to prove that I(x) ∩
I(y) = ∅, i.e., L(y) > R(x), for every 1
2
> y > x > 0.
Associated with x and y we select n0, the minimum natural number with the
property that n > n0 implies y > x+ (εx)
n−1. We also select y − x− (εx)
n0 >
ε > 0 sufficiently small to allow for the existence of k1 and k2, natural numbers
with the properties
1−
x
2
< 1− y + k1ε 6 1 and x+ εx < y + k2ε 6 1
4 Observe that the full force of PDT and WP is not used along the proof. Our
argument ensures incompatibility of a weaker version of PDT with a weaker version
of WP.
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A sequential application of (a relaxed version of) PDT proves that
L(y) =W (1− y, y, y, ....) >
> W (1− y + ε, y, n0−1.........., y, y − ε, y, y, ....) > ... >
> W
(
1− y + k1 ε, y, n0−1.........., y, y − ε, k1........., y − ε, y, y, ....
)
> ... >
> W
(
1− y + k1 ε, y + k2 ε, n0−1.........., y + k2 ε, y − ε,
k1+k2·(n0−1)..................., y − ε, y, y, ....
)
(Intuitively: we compare streams where a positive amount ε of utility is ex-
changed between a generation beyond the n0 threshold and another before it,
which preserves their relative ranking. And we do this k1 + k2 · (n0 − 1) many
times). Now (a relaxed version of) WP assures that
W
(
1− y + k1 ε, y + k2 ε, n0−1........, y + k2 ε, y − ε, k2·n0............., y − ε, y, y, ....
)
>
W
(
1−
x
2
, x+ εx, x+ (εx)
2, ....
)
= R(x)
because 1 − y + k1ε > 1 −
x
2
, y + k2ε > x + εx > x + (εx)
2 > ...., and
y > y − ε > x+ (εx)
n0 > x+ (εx)
n0+1 > .... This completes the argument. 
Proposition 5 yields the significant conclusion that representability of the so-
cial ordering is compatible with the respect of some inequality aversion and
responsiveness to individual increases of utility. We have evidences that this
result is not robust with respect to the choice of the efficiency axiom, v.g.,
Proposition 6. It is interesting to analyze if this situation is robust with re-
spect to the particular form of inequality aversion. This is not the case when
we replace PDT with either VWIA or HE, as we proceed to prove in the next
Propositions 7 and 8.
Proposition 7 There are not SWFs on X = [0, 1]N that verify VWIA and
WP. 5
Proof: If W : X −→ R verifies VWIA and WP then we can assign an
uncountable number of different rational numbers, which is impossible, in the
following manner. Let ε = 0.1, δ = 0.2. For each 0 < x < 1
2
we let
L(x) :=W ((x)con) and R(x) :=W
(
x+ ε, x+ ε2, x+ ε3, ....
)
thus I(x) := (L(x), R(x)) 6= ∅ due to WP. We proceed to prove that I(x) ∩
I(y) = ∅ for every 1
2
> y > x > 0.
Case 1: y > x+ ε. Then the conclusion follows from WP since y > x+ εn for
each n thus L(y) =W ((y)con) > R(x).
5 Again, our argument ensures incompatibility of VWIA with a weaker version of
WP.
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Case 2: x+ ε > y. Now we select z, a number strictly between x and y, such
that x+ ε > x+ ε2 > ... > x+ εn > z > x+ εn+1 > ... for some n (that is: a
number y > z > x that does not coincide with any x+ εn). We use the trivial
consequence z > z+x+ε
m+1
2
> x+ εm+1 for each m = n, n+1, ..... A sequential
application of VWIA proves that
L(y) > W ((z)con)
(†)
> W
(
x+ δ, z, n−1.........., z,
z + x+ εn+1
2
, z, ....
)
(‡)
>
> W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, z, n−2.........., z,
z + x+ εn+1
2
,
z + x+ εn+2
2
, z, ....
)
> ... >
> W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, ...., x+ εn−1,
z + x+ εn+1
2
, ....,
z + x+ ε2n
2
, z, z, ...
)
To be precise, inequality (†) derives from x + δ > x + ε > z > z+x+ε
n+1
2
, (‡)
derives from x+ ε > z > z+x+ε
n+2
2
, and so forth. Now WP assures that
W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, ...., x+ εn−1,
z + x+ εn+1
2
, ....,
z + x+ ε2n
2
, z, z, ...
)
>
W
(
x+ ε, x+ ε2, x+ ε3, ....
)
= R(x)
This completes the argument. 
Proposition 8 There are not SWFs on X = [0, 1]N that verify HE and WP.
6
Proof: If W : X −→ R verifies HE and WP then we can assign an un-
countable number of different rational numbers, which is impossible, in the
following manner. Let ε = 0.1, δ = 0.2. For each 0 < x < 1
2
we let
L(x) :=W
(
x+ ε2, x+ ε3, x+ ε4, ....
)
, R(x) :=W
(
x+ ε, x+ ε2, x+ ε3, ....
)
thus I(x) := (L(x), R(x)) 6= ∅ due to WP. We proceed to prove that I(x) ∩
I(y) = ∅, or W (y + ε2, y + ε3, y + ε4, ....) > W (x+ ε, x+ ε2, x+ ε3, ....), for
every 1
2
> y > x > 0.
Case 1: y + ε2 > x + ε, i.e., y − x > ε − ε2. Then y + εn+1 > x+ εn follows
from trivial computations for each n = 1, 2, ...., thus WP yields the thesis.
Case 2: y+ ε2 6 x+ ε. Let m > 1 denote the first index for which y+ εm+1 >
x + εm. This number is well defined because limk( y + ε
k+1) = y > x =
limk( x + ε
k). Observe that y + εn+1 > x + εn for each n > m too, because
y − x > εm(1− ε) > εn(1− ε) for all n > m. We use the trivial consequence
y + εn+1 > 1
2
(y + εn+1 + x+ εn) = x+y+ε
n(1+ε)
2
> x+ εn for each n > m.
6 Again, our argument ensures incompatibility of HE with a weaker version of WP.
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A sequential application of HE proves that
L(y)
(†)
> W
(
x+ δ, y + ε3, y + ε4, ...., y + εm,
x+ y + εm(1 + ε)
2
, y + εm+2, ...
)
(‡)
>
W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, y + ε4, ...., y + εm,
x+ y + εm(1 + ε)
2
,
x+ y + εm+1(1 + ε)
2
, y + εm+3, ...
)
> ... >
> W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, ...., x+ εm−2,
x+ y + εm(1 + ε)
2
, ...,
x+ y + ε2m−2(1 + ε)
2
, y + ε2m, ...
)
To be precise, inequality (†) derives from x+ δ > x+ ε > y+ ε2 > y+ εm+1 >
x+y+εm(1+ε)
2
, (‡) derives from x+ε > y+ε2 > y+ε3 > y+εm+2 > x+y+ε
m+1(1+ε)
2
,
and so forth. Now WP assures that
W
(
x+ δ, x+ ε, ...., x+ εm−2,
x+ y + εm(1 + ε)
2
, ...,
x+ y + ε2m−2(1 + ε)
2
, y + ε2m, ...
)
>
W
(
x+ ε, x+ ε2, x+ ε3, ....
)
= R(x)
because x + δ > x + ε, x + ε > x + ε2, ... , and x+y+ε
m(1+ε)
2
> x + εm,
..., x+y+ε
2m−2(1+ε)
2
> x + ε2m−2, y + ε2m > x + ε2m−1, .... This completes the
argument. 
5 Concluding remarks
We have studied SWFs on X = [0, 1]N in order to establish trade-offs between
the number of generations that suffice to improve the social welfare, and two
general classes of consequentialist equity axioms. The first class admits a gra-
dation in terms of how large is the extended present (in order to compare its
interest and the interest of its future). The second class includes variations
of the Hammond Equity principle that express aversion to inequality. Our
findings for social welfare functions are summarized as follows:
• Proposition 1 concerns how far we can extend the interest of the present. It
puts bounds to the compromise between the interest of the extended present
with respect to both efficiency (as myopic versions of strong Pareto or weak
dominance) and egalitarianism as Restricted Non-Substitution. Together
with Proposition 3, it establishes that if anonymity is imposed then we
have total incompatibility independently of which compromise we propose.
Proposition 2 discards any conjunction of anonymity and myopic versions
of the strong Pareto principle in any non-trivial setting, which complements
the celebrated result by Basu and Mitra (2003) that anonymity and strong
Pareto are incompatible.
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• Neither Hammond Equity nor a variation of it called VWIA, which are
equivalent under weak dominance, are compatible with any arbitrarily weak
version of WD n. Both are incompatible with WP too (cf., Propositions 7
and 8). Thus the distributive fairness that they capture is not compatible
with positive responsiveness to increases of the utilities of any fixed finite
number of generations, or of all generations.
• We are not aware of any direct proof that SWFs can implement the Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle. Our analysis presents a construction of a social
welfare function that verifies such axiom, plus anonymity and weak domi-
nance (cf., Proposition 5). This is in striking contrast with the discussion
above. However we have proved that no SWF can verify the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle and Weak Pareto simultaneously.
It has been argued that “continuity and representability can be considered
rather demanding in infinite-horizon settings” and that “impossibility results
[....] can be avoided if continuity or representability assumptions are dispensed
with” (Bossert et al., 2007, p. 588). It is nonetheless true that other routes
of escape have been brought to light. Alcantud and Garc´ıa-Sanz (2010a, b)
advocate for the use of appropriate domain restriction in order to keep rep-
resentability when [0, 1]N excludes it, in line with prior studies like Basu and
Mitra (2007). Besides, our Propositions 1 and 5 add to other evidences (e.g.,
Basu and Mitra, 2007, Theorem 5) to conclude that incompatibility of rep-
resentability and attractive sets of axioms must not be universally presumed.
Hara et al. (2008) have proposed a taxonomy for relevant results on the evalu-
ation of infinite utility streams. By invoking it they have characterized various
results by suitable combinations of three crucial criteria: (1) rationality prop-
erties of the social evaluation, (2) robustness of the ranking to “small” pertur-
bations of the infinite streams, and (3) sensitivity conditions, in the form of (i)
sensitivity to efficiency, (ii) sensitivity to equity. We adopt this logical scheme
to compare our results with others from the literature. In order to better fulfil
this aim we add another criteria, namely (0) the structure of the set of utility
streams, viz., if it is any non-trivial setting, [0, 1]N , l∞, or the like. Two tables
gather our taxonomical attempt. Table 1 helps to compare results when the
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is assumed. In Table 2 other equity principles
are imposed under representability.
In Table 1, HSSX1 means Hara et al. (2008), Theorem 1 (see also comment
in page 185). It concerns upper/lower semicontinuous relations with respect
to the sup topology, and l∞+ means the bounded sequences with non-negative
values in every component. BSS1 means Bossert et al. (2007), Theorem 1. In
fact this Theorem identifies all the complete preorders that verify the prop-
erties in Criteria (3). A5 and A7 are Propositions 5 and 7 here. With respect
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Table 1
Results relating to inequality aversion. I holds for Impossibility, P holds for Possi-
bility.
(0) (1) (2) (3)
HSSX1: I l∞+ ⊆ X, Acyclicity Usc/Lsc wrt (i) None
X+ l∞+ ⊆ X sup topol. (ii) PDT
BSS1: P RN Compl. preorder None (i) SP
(ii) PDT, AN
A5: P [0, 1]N Representability None (i) WD
(ii) PDT, AN
A6: I [0, 1]N Representability None (i) WP
(ii) PDT
A7: I [0, 1]N Representability None (i) WP
(ii) VWIA
A8: I [0, 1]N Representability None (i) WP
(ii) HE
to BSS1, A5 states that we can gain representability at the cost of efficiency.
A6, i.e., Proposition 6 here, clarifies that WD can not be replaced by WP
(or improved to PP) in Proposition 5 even if we forgo AN. A7/Proposition 7,
resp. A8/Proposition 8, specify that A6 remains true if distributive fairness is
implemented via VWIA, resp. HE, instead of via PDT.
In Table 2, B1 is Banerjee (2006), Theorem 1. AG1 is Alcantud and Garc´ıa-
Sanz (2010a), Theorem 1. By comparison it proves that in its setting, pos-
sibility is reached with better performance both of efficiency and equity. A
comparison can be made between B1 and A1, that is, Proposition 1 here.
By Proposition 1 (b), impossibility is preserved when HEF is reinforced to
mRNS and WD is weakened to WDn if n 6 m, the other case yielding trivial
compatibility with the SPn axiom (Proposition 1 (a)). A3 (i.e., Proposition
3) furnishes the information that generations are not treated equally in the
representations that case A1 allows for. A2 (i.e., Proposition 2) completes the
analysis: it adds the information that anonymity can not obtain in the SPn
representations that case A1 allows for, even if mRNS is dropped and the
setting is the simplest non-trivial one.
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Table 2
Results for other equity axioms under representability. I holds for Impossibility, P
holds for Possibility.
(0) (1) (2) (3)
B1: I [0, 1]N Representab. None (i) WD
(ii) HEF
AG1: P X = Y N, Representab. None (i) PP
Y ⊆ N∗ (ii) RNS, AN
A1: I (n 6 m) l∞ (n 6 m) Representab. None (i) WDn
(SPn if n > m)
P (n > m) [0, 1]N (n > m) (ii) mRNS
A3: I [0, 1]N Representab. None (i) WDn
(ii) mRNS, AN
A2: I Non-trivial Representab. None (i) SPn
(ii) AN
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